University of Tehran Press Philosophy of Religion 2008-7063 7 5 2010 04 21 Critical Examination of the Theory of Mind-Brain Identity Critical Examination of the Theory of Mind-Brain Identity 19 38 22393 FA Abdolrasoul Kashfi Journal Article The theory of dualism, i.e. duality of mind and body is, from most of the religious scholars and theologian's point of view, a theoretical basis for believes to hereafter. Today the doctrine of physicalism is the most important challenge against dualism and whereby, mind and its moods, either are unrealistic and illusion (eliminative physicalism), or reductive physicalism; i.e. reduce them to material affairs. The theory of Mind-brain identity is a branch of reductive physicalism according to which, mind and its moods are nothing but mental and neural processes. So the death of mind and its moods comes after death of carnal body. In this paper besides presentation of the theory of mind-brain identity and its basis (the principle of elimination and redaction), we will show firstly the former is not provable, secondly, if it were so, it is unable alone to prove this identity. Moreover, the principle of reduction because of its contradiction with Leibniz principle is not also useable. The theory of dualism, i.e. duality of mind and body is, from most of the religious scholars and theologian's point of view, a theoretical basis for believes to hereafter. Today the doctrine of physicalism is the most important challenge against dualism and whereby, mind and its moods, either are unrealistic and illusion (eliminative physicalism), or reductive physicalism; i.e. reduce them to material affairs. The theory of Mind-brain identity is a branch of reductive physicalism according to which, mind and its moods are nothing but mental and neural processes. So the death of mind and its moods comes after death of carnal body. In this paper besides presentation of the theory of mind-brain identity and its basis (the principle of elimination and redaction), we will show firstly the former is not provable, secondly, if it were so, it is unable alone to prove this identity. Moreover, the principle of reduction because of its contradiction with Leibniz principle is not also useable. https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_22393_ad7a56645fcfda9b3436271850604962.pdf