University of Tehran Press Philosophy of Religion 2008-7063 18 1 2021 03 21 William Rowe's Evidential Argument From Evil and the Skeptical Theists' Responses William Rowe's Evidential Argument From Evil and the Skeptical Theists' Responses 1 22 73736 10.22059/jpht.2019.266801.1005601 FA Mohammad Mohammad Rezai Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran Mohsen Javadi Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Theology, University of Qom, Qom, Iran Shima Shahriyari PhD student, Department of Philosophy, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2018 12 03 William Rowe’s various works on the evidential argument from evil now occupies a central place in the Western discussions on the problem of evil. In one of his formulations, Rowe tries to justify the atheistic belief by showing the likelihood of gratuitous evil’s existence based on some particular instances of intense suffering. However, some of the philosophers, who are called skeptical theists, attempt to show that if there is a God, it is completely rational to accept that the humans are not in a cognitive position to make true judgments about all of the divine intentions and actions. Therefore, we cannot infer God’s justification(s) for the prescription of what seems to us to be an instance of intense suffering. Our aim in this paper is to show that skeptical theism offers a good reason to reject the evidential problem of evil developed by William Rowe. William Rowe’s various works on the evidential argument from evil now occupies a central place in the Western discussions on the problem of evil. In one of his formulations, Rowe tries to justify the atheistic belief by showing the likelihood of gratuitous evil’s existence based on some particular instances of intense suffering. However, some of the philosophers, who are called skeptical theists, attempt to show that if there is a God, it is completely rational to accept that the humans are not in a cognitive position to make true judgments about all of the divine intentions and actions. Therefore, we cannot infer God’s justification(s) for the prescription of what seems to us to be an instance of intense suffering. Our aim in this paper is to show that skeptical theism offers a good reason to reject the evidential problem of evil developed by William Rowe. https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_73736_b85884271a1f93909437152002da2eb9.pdf