University of Tehran Press Philosophy of Religion 2008-7063 19 2 2022 06 22 An Evaluation of the Argument by Ishtiyaque Haji on the Incompatibility of Moral Obligations and Causal Determinism An Evaluation of the Argument by Ishtiyaque Haji on the Incompatibility of Moral Obligations and Causal Determinism 201 221 88371 10.22059/jpht.2022.346271.1005917 FA Ruhullah Mowahedi PhD Holder in Islamic philosophy, Higher Education Complex of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran 0000-0002-3294-196X Reza Berenjkar Professor, Faculty of Jurisprudence and Philosophy, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran 0000-0001-5712-9823 Journal Article 2022 05 24 Emphasizing an already unattended part of the free will question and in the past two decades, Ishtiyaque Haji has argued that causal determinism challenges not only moral responsibility but also moral obligations. To this end, he tries to defend the incompatibility of moral obligations with causal determinism by proving that moral obligations have alternative possibilities and then showing its conflict with causal determinism. The article at hand examines his viewpoint to proving the possibility of strong alternatives for moral obligations – as an important factor for the preservation of the validity of his argument – and tries to show that his claim about the moral obligations’ lack of need to ultimate origination is an incorrect or at least unreasonable factor. It is noteworthy that this criticism only questions his argument method; therefore, it not only does not pose a problem for his main claim about the incompatibility of moral obligations and causal determinism, but also strengthens it. Emphasizing an already unattended part of the free will question and in the past two decades, Ishtiyaque Haji has argued that causal determinism challenges not only moral responsibility but also moral obligations. To this end, he tries to defend the incompatibility of moral obligations with causal determinism by proving that moral obligations have alternative possibilities and then showing its conflict with causal determinism. The article at hand examines his viewpoint to proving the possibility of strong alternatives for moral obligations – as an important factor for the preservation of the validity of his argument – and tries to show that his claim about the moral obligations’ lack of need to ultimate origination is an incorrect or at least unreasonable factor. It is noteworthy that this criticism only questions his argument method; therefore, it not only does not pose a problem for his main claim about the incompatibility of moral obligations and causal determinism, but also strengthens it. https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_88371_a957d549188f92f2df87a4fb067a52e4.pdf