University of TehranPhilosophy of Religion2008-706317420201221God as a Projection: An Assessment of Feuerbach's Anthropological Atheism TheoryGod as a Projection: An Assessment of Feuerbach's Anthropological Atheism Theory5415667799410.22059/jpht.2020.298399.1005736FASayyid Abdul-RaufAfzaliAssistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, The International Research Institute of Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran0000-0002-8889-4779Journal Article20200316One of the outstanding doubts in the contemporary theology is the depiction of God as a projected image. According to this doubt, God is the same as the unfulfilled human desires and wants that go through a projection process, and then are turned into God. This descriptive-analytical study aims to explain this doubt based on the works of Feuerbach and the commentators of his works, and then criticize it relying mostly on the opinions of Muslim philosophers and theologians. It is suggested in this article that issues such as the difference in the way projection is conceptualized by Feuerbach and psychologists, the non-confirmation of this theory, its extreme humanistic basis, the anthropological atheism, and the ineffectiveness of some functionalist justifications are among the problems with this viewpoint.One of the outstanding doubts in the contemporary theology is the depiction of God as a projected image. According to this doubt, God is the same as the unfulfilled human desires and wants that go through a projection process, and then are turned into God. This descriptive-analytical study aims to explain this doubt based on the works of Feuerbach and the commentators of his works, and then criticize it relying mostly on the opinions of Muslim philosophers and theologians. It is suggested in this article that issues such as the difference in the way projection is conceptualized by Feuerbach and psychologists, the non-confirmation of this theory, its extreme humanistic basis, the anthropological atheism, and the ineffectiveness of some functionalist justifications are among the problems with this viewpoint.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_77994_4a74c6fe383369fa612ba87ef374192b.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy of Religion2008-706317420201221The Ethical Motivation Factors in Ibn Arabi’s Mystic TheologyThe Ethical Motivation Factors in Ibn Arabi’s Mystic Theology5675857484210.22059/jpht.2020.275860.1005642FAAlirezaAramPhD Holder in Philosophy of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran0000-0003-1437-9018Sayyed AhmadFazeliAssistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, IranJournal Article20191109The main question of this study was to identify the ethical motivation factors from the viewpoint of Ibn Arabi and to depict the path through which the ethical agent would achieve the optimal life intended by religion and ethics. A reference to Ibn Arabi’s works using a descriptive-analytical method made it possible for us to explain the ethical motivation steps as follows. In order to expand the existence, the general Divine grace bestowed the virtue of life onto the human, while the specific grace of sublime God installed the human as the (potential) collection of Names. The knowledge that is gifted by God and leads to knowing the world of archetypes informs the human about the reality of his existence. The divine grace and the human’s knowledge of this grace bring about kindness, set the ground for him to make effort, and make the context for the growth of optimal human character. Finally, the station of guardianship and knowledge about the divine guardians is another aspect of the divine grace, a way to recompense for the human knowledge incompleteness, and a compensation for his defective ambition; the last factor accelerates the transition from ethical motivation to ethical act.The main question of this study was to identify the ethical motivation factors from the viewpoint of Ibn Arabi and to depict the path through which the ethical agent would achieve the optimal life intended by religion and ethics. A reference to Ibn Arabi’s works using a descriptive-analytical method made it possible for us to explain the ethical motivation steps as follows. In order to expand the existence, the general Divine grace bestowed the virtue of life onto the human, while the specific grace of sublime God installed the human as the (potential) collection of Names. The knowledge that is gifted by God and leads to knowing the world of archetypes informs the human about the reality of his existence. The divine grace and the human’s knowledge of this grace bring about kindness, set the ground for him to make effort, and make the context for the growth of optimal human character. Finally, the station of guardianship and knowledge about the divine guardians is another aspect of the divine grace, a way to recompense for the human knowledge incompleteness, and a compensation for his defective ambition; the last factor accelerates the transition from ethical motivation to ethical act.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_74842_ff9d43831c06985a6a7cbfb7ccdb557b.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy of Religion2008-706317420201221Examining and Explaining Avicenna’s Response to the Doubt on the Conflict Between the Necessity of Contentment With the Divine Decree in Ethical EvilsExamining and Explaining Avicenna’s Response to the Doubt on the Conflict Between the Necessity of Contentment With the Divine Decree in Ethical Evils5876087799510.22059/jpht.2020.303129.1005751FARuhollahZeinaliAssistant Professor, Islamic Knowledge Department, Hakim Sabzevari University, Sabzevar, Iran0000-0003-1395-0067Journal Article20200519One of the challenges facing the belief in the universality of the divine decree is the doubt on the conflict between the necessity of the contentment with the divine decree and the necessity of discontentment with the ethical evils. Avicenna has given in a two-part response to this doubt. In the first part, he examines the ethical evils’ mode of relationship with actor and acceptor, with only the latter relationship as leading to evilness. In the second part, he distinguishes the essential and accidental matters, and deems accidental evils as subject to the divine decree. This response solves the doubt only if the evils do not have any true existence and their existence is arbitrary. In this case, the contentment with something that does not have a true existence is not necessary and the doubt is answered. There are evidences in Avicenna’s words based on which we can figure out that he believed in the arbitrariness of the evils. This study shows that these evidences imply that Avicenna believed in this meaning of evilness. Of course, if one does not accept this implication, then Avicenna’s response to this doubt cannot be considered as an appropriate answer.One of the challenges facing the belief in the universality of the divine decree is the doubt on the conflict between the necessity of the contentment with the divine decree and the necessity of discontentment with the ethical evils. Avicenna has given in a two-part response to this doubt. In the first part, he examines the ethical evils’ mode of relationship with actor and acceptor, with only the latter relationship as leading to evilness. In the second part, he distinguishes the essential and accidental matters, and deems accidental evils as subject to the divine decree. This response solves the doubt only if the evils do not have any true existence and their existence is arbitrary. In this case, the contentment with something that does not have a true existence is not necessary and the doubt is answered. There are evidences in Avicenna’s words based on which we can figure out that he believed in the arbitrariness of the evils. This study shows that these evidences imply that Avicenna believed in this meaning of evilness. Of course, if one does not accept this implication, then Avicenna’s response to this doubt cannot be considered as an appropriate answer.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_77995_588b7cbd2bbd892018c2807c2281e691.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy of Religion2008-706317420201221A Look at Alvin Plantinga's Attempt to Answer Freud's Doubt on the Origin of Belief in GodA Look at Alvin Plantinga's Attempt to Answer Freud's Doubt on the Origin of Belief in God6096337811710.22059/jpht.2020.305033.1005761FAJalalPeykaniAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Payame Noor University, Tehran, IranSadatHosseiniStudent of the Department of Philosophy of Religion (Theology), Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iranhosseinisadat9MahinRezaeiAssistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Payame Noor University, Tehran, IranZeinabShakibiAssistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran0000-0002-7068-6293Journal Article20200524Based on his psychoanalytic principles, Freud provided an analysis of the origin and function of religion that influenced a wide range of twentieth-century thinkers. These influences often played a negative role, so most religious people either rejected Freud's analysis or viewed it with skepticism. Plantinga is one of the thinkers who adopt a relatively special view to Freud's analysis. In this article, we first briefly describe Freud's analysis of the origin and function of religion. We then present Plantinga's view on Freud's analysis, and finally show what role Plantinga's attention to Freud plays in the formation of Plantinga's religious epistemology. That is, one of Plantinga's main motives in discussing the theory of the fundamentality of belief in God, sensus divinitatis, and the theory of warranted belief is to avoid facing the doubt raised by Freud. However, a study of Plantinga's religious epistemology shows that his solution is not adequate, and that Freud's doubt cannot be answered through the way Plantinga has adopted.Based on his psychoanalytic principles, Freud provided an analysis of the origin and function of religion that influenced a wide range of twentieth-century thinkers. These influences often played a negative role, so most religious people either rejected Freud's analysis or viewed it with skepticism. Plantinga is one of the thinkers who adopt a relatively special view to Freud's analysis. In this article, we first briefly describe Freud's analysis of the origin and function of religion. We then present Plantinga's view on Freud's analysis, and finally show what role Plantinga's attention to Freud plays in the formation of Plantinga's religious epistemology. That is, one of Plantinga's main motives in discussing the theory of the fundamentality of belief in God, sensus divinitatis, and the theory of warranted belief is to avoid facing the doubt raised by Freud. However, a study of Plantinga's religious epistemology shows that his solution is not adequate, and that Freud's doubt cannot be answered through the way Plantinga has adopted.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_78117_2036d97efe3a6c5c45d914849955bb22.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy of Religion2008-706317420201221From the Christian Intellect of the Middle Ages to the Human Intellect of Renaissance: An Investigation of the Relationship between Faith and Wisdom in the Western Thought Based on Saint Augustine OpinionsFrom the Christian Intellect of the Middle Ages to the Human Intellect of Renaissance: An Investigation of the Relationship between Faith and Wisdom in the Western Thought Based on Saint Augustine Opinions6356597484110.22059/jpht.2020.252218.1005547FAMinaMohammadi VakilAssistant Professor, Department of Painting, Faculty of Art, Alzahra University, Tehran, IranHasanBolkhari GhehiProfessor, Advanced Studies of Art Department, University of Tehran, Tehran, IranJournal Article20191016The philosophy of Middle Ages began with the stances of Saint Augustine. In his teaching “I am guilty, therefore I exist” he defines the truth and existence of the human for the first time based on a human, non-divine action. The examination of the evolution from Saint Augustine’s foregoing statement to that of Descartes (I think, therefore I am) on the one hand shows the long-lasting challenge in solving the relationship between perception and truth, and on the other hand, determines the roots of modernism in some opinions suggested in Middle Ages. This article explains some of the most fundamental opinions of the Middle Ages thinkers such as Abelard’s Skeptism theory as the instrument to attain the truth, Saint Francis’ point that the truth is more a lowly thing within the human rather than a sublime matter, Voluntaryism and individualism of William of Ockham and Nicholas of Autrecourt, etc. This way, it clarifies the way the human intellect is represented in the modern age and the procedure that led to the production of the proposition “I think, therefore I am.” The study was descriptive-analytical in nature and used indicative reasoning for data analysis purposes. The findings revealed that the basis of Descartes’ philosophy (as the father of modern philosophy) is adopted from Saint Augustine’s thoughts. In other words, not only the beginning of the Middle Ages but also the establishment of the modern age should be attributed to Saint Augustine.The philosophy of Middle Ages began with the stances of Saint Augustine. In his teaching “I am guilty, therefore I exist” he defines the truth and existence of the human for the first time based on a human, non-divine action. The examination of the evolution from Saint Augustine’s foregoing statement to that of Descartes (I think, therefore I am) on the one hand shows the long-lasting challenge in solving the relationship between perception and truth, and on the other hand, determines the roots of modernism in some opinions suggested in Middle Ages. This article explains some of the most fundamental opinions of the Middle Ages thinkers such as Abelard’s Skeptism theory as the instrument to attain the truth, Saint Francis’ point that the truth is more a lowly thing within the human rather than a sublime matter, Voluntaryism and individualism of William of Ockham and Nicholas of Autrecourt, etc. This way, it clarifies the way the human intellect is represented in the modern age and the procedure that led to the production of the proposition “I think, therefore I am.” The study was descriptive-analytical in nature and used indicative reasoning for data analysis purposes. The findings revealed that the basis of Descartes’ philosophy (as the father of modern philosophy) is adopted from Saint Augustine’s thoughts. In other words, not only the beginning of the Middle Ages but also the establishment of the modern age should be attributed to Saint Augustine.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_74841_d981b583ff6022572dc916ea064fed45.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy of Religion2008-706317420201221An Analysis of the Relationship Between Life Attribute and Other Divine Attributes From the Viewpoint of Fakhr RaziAn Analysis of the Relationship Between Life Attribute and Other Divine Attributes From the Viewpoint of Fakhr Razi6616817565510.22059/jpht.2020.293236.1005714FAAmirhoseinMansouri NouriPhD Student, Shahid Rajaii Teacher training University, Tehran, IranFatemeKookaramPhD Student, Shahid Rajaii Teacher training University, Tehran, IranMohsenShamsPhD Student, Shahid Rajaii Teacher training University, Tehran, IranEinollahKhademiProfessor, Shahid Rajaii Teacher Training University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20191203This study set out to answer the fundamental question on the relationship between the divine life attribute and other divine attributes from the viewpoint of Fakhr Razi. First, Fakhr’s concern with knowing the attributes was examined. His concern has been to achieve the complete knowledge or at least knowledge that enables the human to fulfill his intellectual liability for knowing the Creator. Then, the relationship of knowledge and power with life was investigated. The results showed that knowledge and power are two means of life, and life functions as their cause. In the next step, the relationship between volition and life was explored. It was revealed that Fakhr deems volition as subsequent to knowledge. Then the hearing and seeing attributes were scrutinized. It was discovered that Fakhr takes these two attributes as concomitant to knowledge or as means of it. In addition, the speaking attribute was examined, and it was found that speech reveals either knowledge or power, and this way connects to the essence. Finally, the eternity of the sublime God was found to be concomitant with His life. The overall finding of the study is that from the viewpoint of Fakhr Razi, the Divine Life is the central attribute connecting other attributes; without the life attribute, other attributes could not exist.This study set out to answer the fundamental question on the relationship between the divine life attribute and other divine attributes from the viewpoint of Fakhr Razi. First, Fakhr’s concern with knowing the attributes was examined. His concern has been to achieve the complete knowledge or at least knowledge that enables the human to fulfill his intellectual liability for knowing the Creator. Then, the relationship of knowledge and power with life was investigated. The results showed that knowledge and power are two means of life, and life functions as their cause. In the next step, the relationship between volition and life was explored. It was revealed that Fakhr deems volition as subsequent to knowledge. Then the hearing and seeing attributes were scrutinized. It was discovered that Fakhr takes these two attributes as concomitant to knowledge or as means of it. In addition, the speaking attribute was examined, and it was found that speech reveals either knowledge or power, and this way connects to the essence. Finally, the eternity of the sublime God was found to be concomitant with His life. The overall finding of the study is that from the viewpoint of Fakhr Razi, the Divine Life is the central attribute connecting other attributes; without the life attribute, other attributes could not exist.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_75655_2c0d583ea054717fa9d26665b650c9bc.pdfUniversity of TehranPhilosophy of Religion2008-706317420201221The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freewill: Critical Analysis of Classical Solutions on the Basis of Zagzebski's OpinionThe Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freewill: Critical Analysis of Classical Solutions on the Basis of Zagzebski's Opinion6837137768510.22059/jpht.2020.239259.1005494FAAliYarizadehMSc. Holder, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Mofid University, Qom, IranMir SaeidMousavi KarimiAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Mofid University, Qom, IranAliGhanbarnejadMSc. Holder, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Mofid University, Qom, IranJournal Article20200408The Problem of the incompatibility between Divine foreknowledge and Human free will, known as "the theological fatalism", is one of the most important and complicated philosophical problems in the tradition of Abrahamic religions. According to this problem, Divine’s infallible foreknowledge of human actc makes them necessary, and hence unfree. In this paper, after explaining the formulation of the problem by Linda Zagzebski, we will criticise three traditional solutions to the problem: the Boethian solution, the Okhamist solution and the Molinist solution. Since one of presupossitions of the problem is God’s everlastingness in time, the Boethian approach tries to solve the problem by rejecting this supposition and assuming that God’s foreknowledge is atemporal. The Okhamists make a distinction between hard facts and soft facts, and try to solve the problem by showing that God’s foreknowledge is a soft fact. According to the Molinists, the problem is solved if the transferring of past necessity is rejected. It will be shown, however, that the main problem of some of these solutions is that they have wrongly assumed temporality of God's knowledge. It is also shown that although the Boethian solution assumes the timelessness of God's Knowledge, cannot solve the problem. At the end, it will be mentioned that having free will is an existential constituent of humans and that human will is throughout the Divine will and knowledge; that is, althogh Divine knowledge is at the top of causal chain, human free will is one of the conditions of establishing free actions. So, Divine foreknowledge is not incompatible with human free will.The Problem of the incompatibility between Divine foreknowledge and Human free will, known as "the theological fatalism", is one of the most important and complicated philosophical problems in the tradition of Abrahamic religions. According to this problem, Divine’s infallible foreknowledge of human actc makes them necessary, and hence unfree. In this paper, after explaining the formulation of the problem by Linda Zagzebski, we will criticise three traditional solutions to the problem: the Boethian solution, the Okhamist solution and the Molinist solution. Since one of presupossitions of the problem is God’s everlastingness in time, the Boethian approach tries to solve the problem by rejecting this supposition and assuming that God’s foreknowledge is atemporal. The Okhamists make a distinction between hard facts and soft facts, and try to solve the problem by showing that God’s foreknowledge is a soft fact. According to the Molinists, the problem is solved if the transferring of past necessity is rejected. It will be shown, however, that the main problem of some of these solutions is that they have wrongly assumed temporality of God's knowledge. It is also shown that although the Boethian solution assumes the timelessness of God's Knowledge, cannot solve the problem. At the end, it will be mentioned that having free will is an existential constituent of humans and that human will is throughout the Divine will and knowledge; that is, althogh Divine knowledge is at the top of causal chain, human free will is one of the conditions of establishing free actions. So, Divine foreknowledge is not incompatible with human free will.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_77685_88833d61c1f6331686b5c1935973abe2.pdf