University of Tehran PressPhilosophy of Religion2008-706319120220321Criticism of Michael Martin’s Proposition of Self-Contradiction of God to Rationalize AtheismCriticism of Michael Martin’s Proposition of Self-Contradiction of God to Rationalize Atheism1268743010.22059/jpht.2022.333311.1005861FAHassanQarehbaghiPhD Student, Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, IranRuhollahNazariMSc. Holder, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, IranMohammadJafariAssociate Professor, Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, IranJournal Article20211101Theism and atheism, the two opposing sides over the course of human history, are responses to the origin of universe and existence. Copious discussions have been made about their discourse, arguments, evidences, and requirements. One of the criticisms of atheists against theists is that the existence of God and His acceptance through the attributes expressed by religions is a self-contradictory issue that will not be accepted if it is perceived correctly. Michael Martin, the contemporary philosopher and atheist, takes attributes such as absolute Knower or absolute Goodness as the reason for the contradiction and denial of the existence of God, and has tried to rationalize atheism this way. Adopting a descriptive-analytical research method, this paper aims to critically examine Martin’s view in this regard and show the weaknesses of limiting the world of being to matter and materiality and likening God to human in the acquisition of knowledge, as God’s presential knowledge (which is the highest level of knowledge) makes Him needless to the human types of knowledge. Martin’s mistake lies in his human-like view to God and his lack of true understanding of the absolute Knower; that is, he should have not addressed the divine knowledge based on a non-philosophical classification of knowledge.Theism and atheism, the two opposing sides over the course of human history, are responses to the origin of universe and existence. Copious discussions have been made about their discourse, arguments, evidences, and requirements. One of the criticisms of atheists against theists is that the existence of God and His acceptance through the attributes expressed by religions is a self-contradictory issue that will not be accepted if it is perceived correctly. Michael Martin, the contemporary philosopher and atheist, takes attributes such as absolute Knower or absolute Goodness as the reason for the contradiction and denial of the existence of God, and has tried to rationalize atheism this way. Adopting a descriptive-analytical research method, this paper aims to critically examine Martin’s view in this regard and show the weaknesses of limiting the world of being to matter and materiality and likening God to human in the acquisition of knowledge, as God’s presential knowledge (which is the highest level of knowledge) makes Him needless to the human types of knowledge. Martin’s mistake lies in his human-like view to God and his lack of true understanding of the absolute Knower; that is, he should have not addressed the divine knowledge based on a non-philosophical classification of knowledge.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_87430_bf26b600c71e318873130c6615a24e93.pdfUniversity of Tehran PressPhilosophy of Religion2008-706319120220321An Analysis of the Relationship Between Faith and Volition With an Emphasis on the Opinions of Plantinga and William JamesAn Analysis of the Relationship Between Faith and Volition With an Emphasis on the Opinions of Plantinga and William James27528289010.22059/jpht.2021.318931.1005813FAFaezehBarzegar TabriziPhD Student, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, IranHassanGhanbariAssociate Professor, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, IranMansourNasiriAssociate Professor, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, IranJournal Article20210211This article is an effort to show that during the history of philosophy – both in the epistemology and ethics domains – evidentialism based on extreme rationalism has tremendously influenced the true mechanism of the formation of faith in God. In the light of a kind of determinism, it has averted attentions from the role of other functions such as emotions, passions, and especially volition in the formation of faith in theists within the common understanding framework. Among the contemporary thinkers, William James and Plantinga have tried to modify this deterministic approach and revive those practical aspects of the formation of faith that are always forgotten. The salient common point in the theories of these two thinkers are the attention to the practical aspects of faith within the common understanding framework and the emphasis on the significant role of volition – in line with reason – in the formation of faith. This way, it can be observed that the opinions of William James and Plantinga about the way the mechanism of faith in God is formed complete each other.This article is an effort to show that during the history of philosophy – both in the epistemology and ethics domains – evidentialism based on extreme rationalism has tremendously influenced the true mechanism of the formation of faith in God. In the light of a kind of determinism, it has averted attentions from the role of other functions such as emotions, passions, and especially volition in the formation of faith in theists within the common understanding framework. Among the contemporary thinkers, William James and Plantinga have tried to modify this deterministic approach and revive those practical aspects of the formation of faith that are always forgotten. The salient common point in the theories of these two thinkers are the attention to the practical aspects of faith within the common understanding framework and the emphasis on the significant role of volition – in line with reason – in the formation of faith. This way, it can be observed that the opinions of William James and Plantinga about the way the mechanism of faith in God is formed complete each other.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_82890_6cf50a5091dae681507b491f90850faa.pdfUniversity of Tehran PressPhilosophy of Religion2008-706319120220321The Examination of Rahner’s Perception of Revelation and its Effect on His View to Religious PluralismThe Examination of Rahner’s Perception of Revelation and its Effect on His View to Religious Pluralism53718412110.22059/jpht.2021.321002.1005820FAAtiyeKeshtkaranPhD Student, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, IranRezaGandomi NasrabadiAssociate Professor, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, IranJournal Article20210424There are three views to revelation in Christianity. According to propositional revelation, the salvation of humanity can be achieved only through the clear and enlightening words of the Bible. In the experimental revelation, the emphasis is on the divine unveiling and the personal relationship between God and human. The third approach introduces revelation as a historical incident. Christian thinkers have provided various opinions for or against these three approaches. One of these figures is Carl Rahner, a contemporary Christian theologian, who has offered concepts similar to these three approaches. In his conceptualization, he deems these three types of revelation as levels of salvations arranged vertically, moving from the experimental revelation/universal salvation of all humans through propositional revelation to the Christianity-specific salvation. From Rahner’s viewpoint, the transcendent revelation is the precondition for understanding the universe, which is accessible due to the infusion of grace and metaphysical existence. The universal categorical revelation can be achieved through God’s unveiling in history, while the specific categorical revelation can be attained through Jesus. All in all, from the viewpoint of Rahner, revelation entails all three experimental, historical, and propositional essences but at different levels. Rahner’s perception of revelation and salvation is to some extent close to those of thinkers such as Hans Küng, John Hick, Karl Barth, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, with different levels of adherence to the church teachings as the differentiating factor. Deriving from his perception of revelation, Rahner’s theory of “anonymous Christians” deems salvation possible for the non-Christians, and so allows for religious inclusivity. However, he believes that achieving absolute salvation is possible only through conscious adoption of Christianity.There are three views to revelation in Christianity. According to propositional revelation, the salvation of humanity can be achieved only through the clear and enlightening words of the Bible. In the experimental revelation, the emphasis is on the divine unveiling and the personal relationship between God and human. The third approach introduces revelation as a historical incident. Christian thinkers have provided various opinions for or against these three approaches. One of these figures is Carl Rahner, a contemporary Christian theologian, who has offered concepts similar to these three approaches. In his conceptualization, he deems these three types of revelation as levels of salvations arranged vertically, moving from the experimental revelation/universal salvation of all humans through propositional revelation to the Christianity-specific salvation. From Rahner’s viewpoint, the transcendent revelation is the precondition for understanding the universe, which is accessible due to the infusion of grace and metaphysical existence. The universal categorical revelation can be achieved through God’s unveiling in history, while the specific categorical revelation can be attained through Jesus. All in all, from the viewpoint of Rahner, revelation entails all three experimental, historical, and propositional essences but at different levels. Rahner’s perception of revelation and salvation is to some extent close to those of thinkers such as Hans Küng, John Hick, Karl Barth, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, with different levels of adherence to the church teachings as the differentiating factor. Deriving from his perception of revelation, Rahner’s theory of “anonymous Christians” deems salvation possible for the non-Christians, and so allows for religious inclusivity. However, he believes that achieving absolute salvation is possible only through conscious adoption of Christianity.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_84121_85308d0648d0945f8e51401ccd200730.pdfUniversity of Tehran PressPhilosophy of Religion2008-706319120220321The Principles and Arguments for the Denial of Divine Attributes in the Imāmīte TheologyThe Principles and Arguments for the Denial of Divine Attributes in the Imāmīte Theology73988551310.22059/jpht.2022.337149.1005880FARezaBerenjkarProfessor of Philosophy and Theology, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, IranMohsenZarepourPhD Holder in Imāmīte Theology, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, IranJournal Article20220110The denial of Divine Attributes is evidently mentioned in the narrations of Ahl al-Bayt (a) and is accepted by most Imāmīte theologians in Imāmīte theological schools. Nevertheless, this stance is today criticized and denied based on philosophical principles – especially those of transcendental theosophy. In this paper, the principles and arguments related to the denial of Divine Attributes are identified and extracted from Imāmīte theological texts of various theological schools. Then, it is shown that this teaching has its specific rational and theological principles. These principles and arguments are the doctrine of the unity of divine essence (with three readings, namely negation of plurality, negation of composition, and negation of similarity), unity of description and attribute, impossibility of describing the essence, impossibility of limitation, createdness of the attribute and the attributed, and the doctrine of creation. In line with what we said, numerous narrations about the denial of attributes support this viewpoint.The denial of Divine Attributes is evidently mentioned in the narrations of Ahl al-Bayt (a) and is accepted by most Imāmīte theologians in Imāmīte theological schools. Nevertheless, this stance is today criticized and denied based on philosophical principles – especially those of transcendental theosophy. In this paper, the principles and arguments related to the denial of Divine Attributes are identified and extracted from Imāmīte theological texts of various theological schools. Then, it is shown that this teaching has its specific rational and theological principles. These principles and arguments are the doctrine of the unity of divine essence (with three readings, namely negation of plurality, negation of composition, and negation of similarity), unity of description and attribute, impossibility of describing the essence, impossibility of limitation, createdness of the attribute and the attributed, and the doctrine of creation. In line with what we said, numerous narrations about the denial of attributes support this viewpoint.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_85513_f3c810dc07829fc4386350cb3dbf0d18.pdfUniversity of Tehran PressPhilosophy of Religion2008-706319120220321Studying the Theological Movements and Their Reflection in Zayn al-Din Kashshi’s ViewStudying the Theological Movements and Their Reflection in Zayn al-Din Kashshi’s View991258743310.22059/jpht.2022.334738.1005870FAAli AsgharJafari ValaniAssociate Professor, Department of Philosophy and Theology,
Shahid Motahari University, Tehran, IranDonyaAsadi Fakhr NejhadMaster’s Student of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Theology, Shahid Motahari University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20211129In his treatise Tuhfa al-ashab fi ma’rifa rabb al-arbab, Zayn al-Din Kashshi adopts a stance similar to Avicennan theosophy and suggests that God has presential knowledge of His own essence and has detailed acquired knowledge of the phenomena before their appearance. At the same time, he takes a view similar to that of Oriental theosophy and suggests that God’s knowledge of the creatures before their appearance is non-detailed and after their creation is non-detailed presential, and all creatures are present for Him with their objective existence. Of course, God’s knowledge of things is free from the mediation of rational forms. In fact, based on the comparative approach toward the two foregoing stances, Kashshi takes God’s knowledge as presential in which the very existence of the known is present for the knower, unlike the acquired knowledge in which the quiddity of the known is known to the knower. Therefore, we might say that taking into account the comprehensive meaning of knowledge that denotes the presence of the known for the knower, Kashshi takes God’s knowledge to be only presential, because this type of knowledge is free from any defect and fault. Moreover, adopting a converging combination of the opinions of his precedent thinkers, Kashshi uses various ways of proving God’s knowledge. In fact, it seems that he indirectly has paved the ground for the advent of a new viewpoint in the future.In his treatise Tuhfa al-ashab fi ma’rifa rabb al-arbab, Zayn al-Din Kashshi adopts a stance similar to Avicennan theosophy and suggests that God has presential knowledge of His own essence and has detailed acquired knowledge of the phenomena before their appearance. At the same time, he takes a view similar to that of Oriental theosophy and suggests that God’s knowledge of the creatures before their appearance is non-detailed and after their creation is non-detailed presential, and all creatures are present for Him with their objective existence. Of course, God’s knowledge of things is free from the mediation of rational forms. In fact, based on the comparative approach toward the two foregoing stances, Kashshi takes God’s knowledge as presential in which the very existence of the known is present for the knower, unlike the acquired knowledge in which the quiddity of the known is known to the knower. Therefore, we might say that taking into account the comprehensive meaning of knowledge that denotes the presence of the known for the knower, Kashshi takes God’s knowledge to be only presential, because this type of knowledge is free from any defect and fault. Moreover, adopting a converging combination of the opinions of his precedent thinkers, Kashshi uses various ways of proving God’s knowledge. In fact, it seems that he indirectly has paved the ground for the advent of a new viewpoint in the future.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_87433_81717b512b77972e52fdf003723ec351.pdfUniversity of Tehran PressPhilosophy of Religion2008-706319120220321An Evaluation and Criticism of the Viewpoints of Socrates and Epicurus about the Fearsomeness of Death Based on the Theories of HarmAn Evaluation and Criticism of the Viewpoints of Socrates and Epicurus about the Fearsomeness of Death Based on the Theories of Harm1271508677010.22059/jpht.2022.338499.1005883FABehrouzAsadiAssistant Professor, Department of Islamic Education, Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, Kermanshah, IranJournal Article20220203As an existential concern of all humans, fear of death has for long grabbed the attention of death thinkers such as Socrates and Epicurus. Socrates deems death as a dreamless sleep and a kind of locational displacement of self, while Epicurus tries to prove harmlessness of death by arguing for non-existence of life after death and lack of any perception after it. The common aspect in the thoughts of these two thinkers is their view to death as something void of perception. However, Socrates does not abandon his belief in eternity and considers lack of perception as transient and only limited to the death event. He likens death to a dreamless sleep to reduce the humans’ fear of death. The main question of the study at hand is that if the non-existence of a person and its ensuing lack of perception reject the possibility of the harm to a deceased person. Some critical theorists believe that death is a kind of harm and damage. Taking into account the theories on the harmfulness of death before (deactivating the passions) and after (frustration and deprivation) it occurs, it seems that death entails a level of harm and damage, and the assumptions and results achieved by Socrates and Epicurus have a lot of problems. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the different solutions offered by these two thinkers through the theories favoring the harmfulness of death. Since there has been no study so far on the relationship between understanding the harmfulness of death and the fear that derives from it, this paper offers a new philosophical stance.As an existential concern of all humans, fear of death has for long grabbed the attention of death thinkers such as Socrates and Epicurus. Socrates deems death as a dreamless sleep and a kind of locational displacement of self, while Epicurus tries to prove harmlessness of death by arguing for non-existence of life after death and lack of any perception after it. The common aspect in the thoughts of these two thinkers is their view to death as something void of perception. However, Socrates does not abandon his belief in eternity and considers lack of perception as transient and only limited to the death event. He likens death to a dreamless sleep to reduce the humans’ fear of death. The main question of the study at hand is that if the non-existence of a person and its ensuing lack of perception reject the possibility of the harm to a deceased person. Some critical theorists believe that death is a kind of harm and damage. Taking into account the theories on the harmfulness of death before (deactivating the passions) and after (frustration and deprivation) it occurs, it seems that death entails a level of harm and damage, and the assumptions and results achieved by Socrates and Epicurus have a lot of problems. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the different solutions offered by these two thinkers through the theories favoring the harmfulness of death. Since there has been no study so far on the relationship between understanding the harmfulness of death and the fear that derives from it, this paper offers a new philosophical stance.https://jpht.ut.ac.ir/article_86770_d1bbc676a96852843eb230e6be73a700.pdf