The concept of moral agency is fundamental to ethical theory, and the question of attributing it to intelligent artificial agents is a central topic in both moral philosophy and machine ethics. Luciano Floridi, in his theory of “mindless morality,” critiques the traditional anthropocentric approach and attempts to extend moral agency to artificial agents. Drawing on the foundations of “information ethics” and “information ontology,” he replaces conditions such as consciousness, intentionality, and free will with criteria such as interactivity, autonomy, and adaptability for moral agency. This study first explains the theoretical foundations of Floridi’s view and the concept of the “level of abstraction,” then critically examines it in comparison with the standard account of moral agency. The findings indicate that although the theory of “mindless morality” is significant for expanding the scope of moral consideration to intelligent technologies and analyzing emerging issues, it faces serious philosophical challenges. These challenges arise from reducing moral agency to functional criteria, neglecting the role of mental states, and making moral agency dependent on the chosen level of abstraction. Finally, it is argued that acknowledging the moral role of artificial agents does not necessarily entail granting them moral agency in the strict philosophical sense. The standard account of moral agency, due to the essential connection it posits between agency and mentality, retains greater explanatory coherence and ontological robustness.