This article deals with the development of the issue of general propositions with a particular regard to the theory of ideas as viewed by Russell. Also, studied is that whether it existed in his earlier and later works, with any theoretical change if any
There are some views at work here: 1) general propositions are nothing but names; 2) general propositions have real existence, as platonic ideas do; and 3) general propositions find expression in individuals, not independently on their own, Russell's critiques of the nominalists indicate his divergence from their views, and there is a platonic inclination in his earlier works, while later on gets closer to Hume in his positivistic standpoints, declaring the issue of general propositions as nonsense. In the third phase and – his last works, he turns back to his initial views. He believes that pure empiricism is no longer reliable and sticks to the theory of general propositions. Not with standing, his ultimate view is at variance with that of Plato, hence he logically accept general names or those which signify relation