Personal identity is a problem in the possibility of Resurrection. What criterion is there that we can say a resurrected man is the same as the expired one? What is the answer in dualism, and what is in physicalism? Does this question cause to deny possibility of Resurrection? Some philosopher claim that we have no criterion for identity between these two. And then, they conclude that after life is impossible. In dualism the problem isn’t personal identity, but bodily identity. In physicalism, Personal identity is the same as bodily identity. Then bodily identity is important both in dualism and physicalism. According to Islamic apologies and narrative, core body is preserved and in time of resurrection this basic, substance and essential material of body will be reestablished. This view resolves all of the difficulties in the possibility of Resurrection and personal identity.
Dibagi, S. M. A., & Daniali, M. J. (2009). Modern approaches in personal identity (the problem of cloning and replica theory and survival of essential material). Philosophy of Religion, 6(3), 53-68.
MLA
Seyed Mohammad Ali Dibagi; Mohammad Javad Daniali. "Modern approaches in personal identity (the problem of cloning and replica theory and survival of essential material)", Philosophy of Religion, 6, 3, 2009, 53-68.
HARVARD
Dibagi, S. M. A., Daniali, M. J. (2009). 'Modern approaches in personal identity (the problem of cloning and replica theory and survival of essential material)', Philosophy of Religion, 6(3), pp. 53-68.
VANCOUVER
Dibagi, S. M. A., Daniali, M. J. Modern approaches in personal identity (the problem of cloning and replica theory and survival of essential material). Philosophy of Religion, 2009; 6(3): 53-68.
)