In his treatise Tuhfa al-ashab fi ma’rifa rabb al-arbab, Zayn al-Din Kashshi adopts a stance similar to Avicennan theosophy and suggests that God has presential knowledge of His own essence and has detailed acquired knowledge of the phenomena before their appearance. At the same time, he takes a view similar to that of Oriental theosophy and suggests that God’s knowledge of the creatures before their appearance is non-detailed and after their creation is non-detailed presential, and all creatures are present for Him with their objective existence. Of course, God’s knowledge of things is free from the mediation of rational forms. In fact, based on the comparative approach toward the two foregoing stances, Kashshi takes God’s knowledge as presential in which the very existence of the known is present for the knower, unlike the acquired knowledge in which the quiddity of the known is known to the knower. Therefore, we might say that taking into account the comprehensive meaning of knowledge that denotes the presence of the known for the knower, Kashshi takes God’s knowledge to be only presential, because this type of knowledge is free from any defect and fault. Moreover, adopting a converging combination of the opinions of his precedent thinkers, Kashshi uses various ways of proving God’s knowledge. In fact, it seems that he indirectly has paved the ground for the advent of a new viewpoint in the future.